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Abstract 
Income shifting refers to the transfer of the tax base to a tax characterised by lower average or 
marginal rates. In the literature the focus is mostly on the shift from corporate taxes to income taxes 
and the effects of this shift on central governments revenues. In this paper, we focus on the effect on 
local tax revenues. In Belgium the local governments do not have access to the tax income from the 
corporate tax, which is levied on corporate income from specific legal persons. Only when a business 
is set up as a sole proprietorship, local governments’ income is affected, through the impact on the 
local income tax (LIT). We test whether the shift to other corporation forms influences the local 
government tax revenue per capita for 308 Flemish municipalities for the period 2005-2013. The 
cross-section fixed effects panel estimations show that the exit of sole proprietorships significantly 
impacts the creation of legal persons, which is in line with what is expected if income shifting should 
occur. In addition, the per capita revenues from the local income tax (LIT) are negatively affected by 
the exit of natural persons. Importantly, the analysis shows that the establishment of new corporations 
results in a significant decrease in the local per capita revenues of the local income tax (LIT), when 
controlling for community fixed effects and economic conditions. 
Keywords: income shifting, local income tax, corporations, natural person 
JEL Classification Code: H24, H25, H32, C23 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the period 2009-2013 Flemish local governments were facing challenging budget problems. 
Tax revenues were decreasing due to the economic recession that resurged in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis. Increasing unemployment, resulted in lower tax revenue income from the local income 
tax, that represented on average 41% of total local tax revenues. Budget pressure also resulted from 
the reform of the local fire departments, the implementation of new regulation regarding the treatment 
of polluted water and the ageing of the staff (Belfius, 2012). Between 2009 and 2012 the annual 
growth rate of the local expenditures (1,8%) exceeded that of the regional (0,9%) and federal 
governments (1,4%). Local councils were facing deficits representing 0,21% of GDP in 2012 (HRF, 
2014). 
To avoid further budget derailment, local governments needed to monitor what moved the tax 
revenues over time. It is well established that the local income tax revenues are sensitive to changes in 
the business cycle and to fiscal reforms. Due to the fact that the revenues are collected by the federal 
government, the timing of the intergovernmental transfers of tax revenues is affecting the balance  
(HRF, 2014). Since the local income tax is a surcharge tax, vertical tax externalities might also matter: 
federal governments deciding to reduce tax rates or increase tax reductions, will generate a loss in tax 
income for local governments (Smolders & Goeminne, 2005).  
Up to now, there has been surprisingly little attention for yet another determinant, which, in a way, 
is related to the fiscal federalism structure of Belgium. That is, income shifting. Income shifting refers 
to the fact that citizens have different opportunities to pay taxes. In case of businesses, earnings are 
either taxed as profits in the corporate tax (CIT), or they might be filed as income in the personal 
income tax (PIT). In Belgium, average and marginal tax rates are much more favourable in the Belgian 
corporate tax system. And, which tax applies predominantly depends on the company’s legal form. 
Though limited liability, capital attraction, business continuity, easy transfer of ownership rights are 
probably the main reasons, fiscal windfalls might well be an ancillary motive for shifting from sole 
proprietorship to a corporation form.  
How could this possibly affect local government’s tax revenues? In fact, this results from the 
allocation of taxing powers over the different government levels. The shifting from sole proprietorship 
to corporation forms end up in a removal of the businesses’ tax base from the income tax, the revenues 
of which are partially allocated to local governments. In turn, the entry of corporations will increase 
the corporate income tax base, but the resulting tax revenues are entirely reserved for the federal 
government. As such, fundamental changes in corporation form might have budgetary implications for 
local governments. 
The main contribution of this paper is that it is the first to investigate the matter. Based on panel 
data analysis covering 308 municipalities and a 9 year time period, we look for the effects of the exit 
of the self-employed sole proprietorships on the per capita local income tax revenues (LIT) in general. 
In addition the impact of the entry of start-ups is analysed. We use data aggregated at the municipal 
level, as more appropriate firm level data reflecting why and when exactly firms decide to change 
corporate form for tax reasons are not available.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of the literature closest 
to the subject. The third section discusses the methodology. The empirical results are presented in the 
fourth section; section 5 contains the conclusions of this paper.  
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1. Income shifting 
Entrepreneurs are free to choose how to set up their business. Either they prefer to start as a natural 
person, being the sole proprietor, or they choose to install a corporation. In general, limited liability, 
accounting standards and reporting rules, the degree of investor protection and corporate rules are the 
most important factors influencing this decision (Egger et al., 2009). The mentioned elements do not 
only determine the discretionary power of the management, but are equally essential for the access to 
external financial resources. Moreover, corporations generally are more easily transferred to next 
generations compared to sole proprietorships, that often disappear in case of the decease of the CEO 
(Gravelle & Kotlikoff, 1993). Yet, starting a corporation generally implies higher start-up investments 
(e.g. the cost of the notarial deed and financial plan, etc.). In addition, corporations are facing more 
extensive obligations related to tax filing and accounting (Egger et al., 2009). As Egger et al., 2009; de 
Mooij & Nicodème, 2008; MacKie-Mason & Gordon, 1997 and Gravelle & Kotlikoff, 1993 
illustrated, fiscal motives may be an important driver too. Choosing for a corporation might result in a 
more favourable tax regime. This might induce the so called income shifting. 
In the literature, income shifting refers to different types of tax payer behaviour. According to 
Alstadsæter & Jacob (2014) income shifting is the process of legally shifting assets or income across 
time, income categories, or tax brackets with the major objective to decrease the tax burden. Different 
types of income shifting occur (Stiglitz, 1985; Alstadsæter & Jacob, 2012). First, income shifting 
results from postponing capital gains (Ivkovic et al., 2005; Jacob, 2011) or dividend payments (Chetty 
& Saez, 2005; Jacob & Jacob, 2012). Secondly, Stephens & Ward-Batts (2004) point to the intra-
familial transfer of income and assets. Finally, income shifting is defined as the switch from labour 
income to capital income. Firms transfer income through dividends rather than wages and adopt the 
organizational form best suited to do so (de Mooij & Nicodème, 2008; Thoresen & Alstadsæter, 
2010).  
The impact of taxes on the choice of the organizational form has been the subject of many papers 
(among others Gentry, 1994; Goolsbee, 1998 & 2004; Gordon & MacKie-Mason, 1990 & 1994; 
MacKie-Mason & Gordon, 1997; de Mooij & Nicodème, 2008). In theory, it is the minimum rate of 
both taxes that determines the tax payer’s choice for a specific type of corporation (Feldstein & 
Slemrod, 1980). Or, according to MacKie-Mason & Gordon (1997) and Goolsbee (1998 & 2004) the 
choice of the juridical form of a company results from comparing the net tax loss with the net non-tax 
gain of income shifting. The tax loss or gain depends not only on the tax rate, but also on the 
deductions and reductions.  
The empirical studies mostly apply for the US and investigate income shifting from the PIT to the 
CIT (Gordon & Slemrod, 2000; Gordon & MacKie-Mason, 1994; MacKie-Mason & Gordon, 1997; 
Goolsbee, 1998 & 2004; Cullen & Gordon, 2007). The majority of these studies report statistical 
significant effects from a change in the tax rate on the way businesses are organised. Goolsbee (1998) 
finds for example that a one percent increase in the CIT rate causes a rise in the capital not belonging 
to corporations with 0,02 to 0,03 percentage points. As in most of these older time series studies, the 
effects are rather limited. More recent studies, like that of Egger et al. (2012) indicate larger effects: an 
increase in the effective CIT tax burden with 1 percent point results in a decrease of the chance of 
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income shifting with 0,1 to 0,3 percent points. These effects are more in line with the earlier studies on 
cross-sectional company data (Goolsbee, 2004).  
For Europe, the number of studies is rather limited and mostly related to Scandinavian countries. 
Pirttilä & Selin (2011) focus on the effects of the introduction of the dual income tax system in 1993 
in Norway, which decreased the marginal rates on capital income in a considerable way. The key 
finding of the study is that though employees exhibit modest, if any, responses to the significant cuts, 
the opposite is true for the self-employed. Since the authors could not discern any corresponding surge 
in the total income of the self-employed, they argue that this should be an indication of income 
shifting. Alstadsæter & Jacob (2014) set up a difference-in-difference analysis to look for income 
shifting by owner–managers in closely held corporations after the introduction of the 10% dividend 
tax cut in Sweden in 2006. They find that individuals with a high ownership share, and thus stronger 
influence on dividend pay-out policies and wage structure, shift more income across bases than 
owners with minority interests. 
More related to the topic of this paper is the study of De Mooij & Nicodème (2008). Based on 
Eurostat-data for 60 sectors in 17 European countries for the period 1997-2003, they investigate the 
effect of a change in the CIT rate on the shifting of businesses to more tax favourable corporation 
forms. In fact, the average European CIT rate decreased between 1985 and 2008 from about 50% to 
30%, while CIT-revenues increased in the same period from 2% to 3% of GDP. De Mooij & 
Nicodème (2008) conclude that a 1% tax rate increase shifts 1% of the businesses to other juridical 
forms of corporations. Yet, in case of a decrease in the CIT rate equivalent to € 1, net CIT revenues 
raise with 76 cents, indicating that 24 cents are compensated by a shift of income from PIT to the CIT. 
However, shifting from the PIT to the CIT is not a budgetary neutral operation: the decrease in the PIT 
revenues dominates the increase in the CIT revenues. 
Da Rin et al. (2011) also provide relevant findings. Their study focusses on how the CIT-rates 
impact on the entry rate of corporations, using Amadeus corporate data for 17 European countries for 
the period 1997-2004. The study demonstrates that increasing CIT rates result in a drop of the entry 
rate in a non-linear way.  
For Belgium in particular, we do not know of any studies exploring the effects of fiscal reforms on 
the choice of the corporation form. In this contribution, we focus on the shift from sole proprietorship 
to corporations who enjoy a more favourable tax treatment. Contrary to former studies, we look for 
secondary effects of the choice of the corporation form, that might result from tax induced income 
shifts. Due to the specific allocation of taxing powers in Belgium, changing from one corporate type to 
another might also affect tax revenues of lower government levels. In fact, sole proprietorships are 
taxed in the personal income tax, the revenues of which are partially distributed to local governments. 
Yet, corporations are taxed in the CIT, which uniquely benefits the federal government. Though the 
determinants of the local income tax were documented before by Bastiaens et al. (2001), Gérard et al. 
(2010), Goeminne (2009), Goeminne et al. (2009), Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Richard et al. (2005) 
and Van Parys & Verbeke (2007), no attention was given to the specific impact of the changes in 
corporation forms.  
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1.2. Corporation form and taxes in Belgium 
In Belgium, sole proprietorships are distinguished from corporations. According to the Corporation 
Code, corporations can be run by one or more persons, but the most distinguishing feature is the 
limited liability. Limited liability implies that the estate of the partners is separated from that of the 
corporation. In this case the corporation itself has rights and duties resulting in debts and possessions 
of its own. In corporations going into default, the private estate of a partner of the corporation cannot 
be addressed to pay the debts of the corporation, contrary to sole proprietorships where the private and 
the company estate intertwine. Limited liability is the basis of “legal personality”. Several legal 
persons are identified: a private company with limited liability (‘BVBA’), a public company limited 
by shares (‘NV’), a limited partnership (with or without share capital) (‘COMMANDITAIRE VP’), a 
general partnership (‘VOF’), a cooperative society (‘CBVBA’) a private company with limited 
liability starter (‘S-BVBA’) or a one-man private company with limited liability (‘Eenmanszaak’). 
Figure 1 illustrates that private companies with limited liability make up more than 60% of all 
corporate forms. 
Figure 1: types of legal persons as a% of the total number of commercial corporations (2013) 
 
Importantly, the tax treatment of sole proprietorships differs from that of corporations. Each 
corporation with the headquarters located in Belgium is subject to the corporate income tax (CIT) if it 
possesses legal personality and if its objective is to generate profits. In the CIT, profits are generally 
taxed at a statutory flat rate of 33,99%. Small and medium enterprises (SME) with a taxable income 
inferior to € 322.500 enjoy the progressive marginal tax shown in table 1. CIT are due to the Flemish 
federal government. 
Table 1: Belgian corporate income tax brackets for SME (fiscal year 2013) 
% from Till 
24,25 € 0 € 25.000 
31,00 € 25.000 € 90.000 
34,50 € 90.000 € 322.500 
 
Comm.V. 
5% 
CV 
3% 
BVBA 
61% 
NV 
20% 
VOF 
3% EBVBA 
7% 
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Clearly, the statutory tax rates in table 1 do not reflect the effective PIT rate, due to the large number 
of deductions and reliefs (Valenduc, 2011; Decoster et al., 2012). Notice that the CEO of corporations 
remains liable to the personal income taxes (PIT) for the revenues enjoyed as the company manager. 
In general however the corporation’s tax base in the PIT is much smaller than that of sole 
proprietorships. 
 
Sole proprietorships are only taxed in the personal income taxes (PIT). PIT marginal tax rates are 
between 25% and 50% (table 2). PIT is a residence-based surcharge tax, levied by the federal, the 
regional and the local governments. The federal government decides on the tax brackets, the  rates and 
the tax deductions. It is also responsible for the collection of the tax revenues. The regional 
governments are allowed to increase or decrease, within certain limits, the taxes paid
1
. Local 
governments levy a surcharge, by means of the so called “aanvullende personenbelasting” (LIT). Due 
to this local component of the PIT the effective tax rate for corporations can spatially differ to a high 
extent.  
In general, the local income tax mirrors the progressive nature of the federal income tax, affecting 
the rich proportionally more than the poor. Income shifting leads to a loss of resources for the local 
governments via the local income tax, when self-employed persons shift from sole proprietorship to 
corporations. In that case they become liable to pay CIT instead of PIT and local governments do not 
share the CIT revenues with the federal government, nor are they allowed to levy a surcharge tax on 
the federal CIT. 
 
Table 2: The Belgian personal income tax brackets (fiscal year 2013) 
% from till 
25,00 € 0,01  € 8.350 
30,00 € 8.350 € 11.890 
40,00 € 11.890 € 19.810 
45,00 € 19.810 € 36.300 
50,00 € 36.300 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that, over time, the implicit rate
2
, reflecting the average effective tax burden for 
the CIT is definitely inferior to that of the PIT. Based on micro data, the average PIT for self-
employed tax payers in Flanders was situated at 10,41% for the fiscal year of 2010 (based on the 
revenues of 2009)
3
. In addition, important differences between the PIT and the CIT are related to the 
tax credits, reliefs and deductions. The PIT rates are calculated using IPCAL-data 
4
 (De Swerdt & 
                                                          
1 However, up to now, only the Flemish regional government has used its taxing power by installing the so called 
‘jobkorting’, a tax reduction of 200-300 euro given from 2007 to 2009 to Flemish citizens active at the labor market. 
2 Source: Eurostat, via http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do 
3 For Belgium as a whole, the average tax rate in the PIT for self-employed tax payers is 11,81%. 
4 The IPCAL-database contains the information of approximately 36.483 PIT tax returns randomly sample within each 
Region.  
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Decoster, 2014). Given the differences in tax burden, entrepreneurs might be driven to shift their 
income from the PIT to the CIT.      
Figure 2: Comparison of the average implicit tax rates in the personal income tax and the corporate income tax
 
Is there evidence of this kind of corporation shift in Belgium? Clearly, the total number of 
corporations in Belgium has increased with 51,6% between 2000 and 2011
5
. The number of self-
employed persons also shows an increasing though less steep trend (+22% between 2000 and 2011). 
Looking at the year-to-year change in the number of self-employed persons and corporations, we can 
conclude that, except for the year 2003, the annual growth in the number of corporations is larger than 
the growth in the number the self-employed persons (figure 3). As this is a rather rough indication of 
corporation shift, an econometric analysis was set up to clarify whether this corporation shift might 
have changed local income tax (LIT) revenues. 
 
Figure 3: The change in the number of corporations and natural persons (2001-2011)
 
 
                                                          
5 Source: the Statistics Department of the National Institute for the Social Security of the Self-Employed (NISSE).  
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2 METHODOLOGY 
To investigate whether income shifting from the PIT to the CIT has affected the local revenues 
from the income tax, the following general specification was estimated: 
LIT_CAPi,t  = α + β1 LIT_RATEi,t-1 + β2 LIT1%i,t-2 + β3 LIT_DEPi,t-1 + β4 NCY_CAPi,t-2 +  
 β5 NP_STOPi,t-2 + β6 LP_STARTi,t-2 + β7 INHABi,t + β8 DEBTi,t + β9 UNEMPLi,t +  
 β10 YOUNGi,t + β11 OLDi,t + β12 Y09 + β13 Y10+ β14 Y11+ β15 Y12+ β16 Y13 + u i,t 
i representing the municipality and t the time component (2005 - 2013) and  
 
LIT_CAP    Per capita revenues of local income tax (in euro) 
LIT_RATE    The local income tax rate 
LIT1%    The revenue of 1% of the LIT per capita (in euro) 
LIT_DEP   The percentage of the LIT revenues in relation to the total revenues 
NCY_CAP   The total number of companies (natural persons and legal persons) per capita  
NP_STOP   The percentage of natural persons that stopped the business 
LP_START   The percentage of start-ups of legal persons  
INHAB    The number of inhabitants  
DEBT  The per capita long term debts in € 1.000   
UNEMPL  The percentage of inhabitants that are unemployed  
YOUNG    The percentage of inhabitants that are below 20  
OLD    The percentage of inhabitants that are over 64  
Y09   Dummy variable: equals 1 for the data of year 2009 and 0 else 
Y10   Dummy variable: equals 1 for the data of year 2010 and 0 else 
Y11   Dummy variable: equals 1 for the date of year 2011 and 0 else 
Y12   Dummy variable: equals 1 for the data of year 2012 and 0 else 
Y13   Dummy variable: equals 1 for the data of year 2013 and 0 else 
To indicate the level of tax shifting, data is needed at the company level revealing when the 
business started up under which regime, and when, eventually, it changed its corporate statute. 
However such specific micro data on the individual behaviour of firms concerning entry, exit or the 
switch to other corporate forms is not available. Therefore we do not directly measure the effect of 
income shifting. Rather, we use proxies to indicate the effect of the shift in corporation form that 
might be induced by income shifting motives.  
The variables of interest in the analysis are NP_STOP (% of natural persons that terminates the 
business) and LP_START (% of start-ups of legal persons). Both were lagged 2 years to take into 
account the process of tax filing. When a natural person stops his activities in year t-2, this will affect 
the revenues of the natural person in the same year, but depending on the precise moment of exit, this 
will be recorded in the tax declaration of year t-1 or year t. According to the fiscal administration a 2 
year lag is the most appropriate one.  
As for NP_STOP, a negative coefficient is expected. Since natural persons are taxed in the local 
income tax, a higher percentage of exits by this type of companies will result in lower revenues from 
the local income tax (LIT) for communities. If the business is not continued the LIT base might also 
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be affected by the loss of local employment. Yet, it might also be realistic to find no effect at all. This 
might be the case if natural persons were generating losses instead of profits in the past.  
The percentage of company start-ups of a legal person (LP_START) contains totally new start-ups 
as well as companies shifting from sole proprietorship to a corporate form. Whereas the first type of 
starters only influences the potential growth of the tax base, the latter might clearly decrease the LIT. 
Yet, in case the start-up of a corporation leads to a local increase in employment, this might generate 
higher revenues of the local income tax per capita. The sign is therefore inconclusive a priori. 
Obviously, local tax revenues do not only depend on the tax rate (LIT_RATE), but also on the 
community’s fiscal capacity. For the local income tax, this is measured as the tax revenue per capita of 
one percent local income tax (LIT1%). This measure is preferred to the average income per capita as it 
allows to take into account the progressiveness of the federal income tax (Van Parys & Verbeke, 
2007). Both coefficients are expected to show positive signs.  
The dependence on the income tax by the local government (LIT_DEP(-1)) and the level of debt 
(DEBT) are introduced in the regressions based on Goeminne et al. (2009). This study revealed that 
the local income tax rate of Flemish communities is clearly related to the mix of tax revenues and to 
the locality’s solvency rate. Since the higher dependence on income tax coincided with higher tax rates 
we expect this to result in higher tax revenues when controlling for the tax base. The same holds for 
the level of debt. 
Former studies on Flemish/Belgian local taxes showed that the level of the income tax revenues 
reflects the needs of the citizens living in the community, in terms of schools, services for elderly and 
social support for the unemployed (Bastiaens et al. ,2001; Gérard et al., 2010; Goeminne, 2009; 
Heyndels & Vuchelen, 1998; Richard et al., 2005; Van Parys & Verbeke, 2007). Hence three indicator 
variables (YOUNG, OLD, UNEMPL) were adopted. The coefficients for the % of citizens younger 
than 20 (YOUNG) and older than 64 (OLD) showed positive signs in former analyses. For UNEMPL 
a negative sign is expected, as this group generally pays very little or no income tax. INHAB, 
representing the number of inhabitants, controls for scale effects. 
 
 NCY_CAP controls for the total number of companies (natural persons and legal persons) per 
capita in a community. It indicates the local policy towards entrepreneurship. A positive sign is 
expected: an increase in the number of companies might increase the number of jobs and local income. 
 
The dummy variables Y09, Y10, Y11, Y12, Y13 were introduced to capture possible effects of the 
crisis.  
The data used in this analysis cover the period 2005-2013
6
 for all 308 Flemish municipalities. 
Descriptive statistics and data sources were reported in Appendix 1 and 2.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Data for earlier periods are not trustworthy according to the administrative body that collects the data.  
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3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Before estimating the main specification, panel regressions were set up to more closely identify the 
relation between starters and terminated businesses.  Given the rupture in the number of corporations 
raised since 2008 (see figure 3), we explicitly control for the post-financial crisis era. Based on the 
Hausman-test, cross-section fixed effects estimations including different time lags were adopted.  
The results in table 3 support the fact that the trend of the number of start-ups of legal persons is 
significantly related to the trend in shutting down the business by natural persons. The effect of 
NP_STOP is identified in the same year, but also for the lagged variables. The positive sign indicates 
that when natural persons  are disappearing,  the number of legal persons on the contrary increases. 
This is what we expect to find in a context of income shifting. 
Table 3: Fixed cross sections panel estimation results
7
 
Dependent variable =  LP_START 
           Independent variables     beta      sign. 
 
 
                                                          
7 Standard errors in parentheses; ***= p<0,001; **=p<0,05; *=p<0,10. 
Intercept -0,01 
 
 
(0,01) 
 
NP_STOP 0,18 *** 
 
(0,06) 
 
NP_STOP(-1) 0,10 * 
 
(0,06) 
 
NP_STOP (-2) 0,78 *** 
 
(0,06) 
 
NP_STOP (-3) 0,30 *** 
 
(0,07) 
 
Y09 -0,03 *** 
 
(0,00) 
 
Y10 -0,02 *** 
 
(0,00) 
 
Y11 -0,02 *** 
 
(0,00) 
 
Y12 -0,04 *** 
 
(0,00) 
 
Y13 -0,05 *** 
 
(0,00) 
 
R-squared 0,26 
Adjusted R-squared 0,16 
N 2464 
Period 2005 – 2013 
Cross sections 308 
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Next, we tested the main effects without specifying the control variables. Table 4 shows that the 
NP_STOP variable has a negative coefficient. As sole proprietorships are closing down, the per capita 
local tax income is negatively affected with a time lag of two years. The second variable of interest, 
NP_START equally shows a negative sign, but the coefficient is not statistically significant (p=0,58). 
Table 4: Fixed cross section panel estimation results 
Dependent variable= LIT_CAP 
Independent variables     beta  sign. 
 
 
We now proceed with including the specific control variables that affect the local tax revenues 
as identified in the literature (see table 5).Related to the key variables, we find that the exit of sole 
proprietorships (NP_STOP(-2)) negatively affects local income tax revenues. Next, LP_START(-2) 
now shows the expected significantly negative coefficient but only at the 0.10 level (p-value=0,09). 
An increase in the number of starting corporations decreases the per capita income tax revenues of the 
local governments. 
8
 
  
                                                          
8
 Leaving out the cases with zero income tax revenues per capita (n=2329) did not change the outcomes of the regression in a 
substantial way. The results of this robustness check are reported in Appendix 3. 
Intercept 247,31 *** 
 
(2,31) 
 
NP_STOP(-2) -73,45 ** 
 
(36,7) 
 
NP_START(-2) -6,92   
 
(12,47) 
 
Y09 61,19 *** 
 
(1,72) 
 
Y10 43,86 *** 
 
(1,72) 
 
Y11 55,00 *** 
 
(1,75) 
 
Y12 26,61 *** 
 
(1,71) 
 
Y13 12,80 *** 
 
(1,77)   
R-squared 0,88 
Adjusted R-squared 0,86 
N 2411 
Period 2005 – 2013 
Cross sections 308 
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Table 5: Fixed cross section panel estimation results 
Dependent variable= LIT_CAP 
             Independent variables                   beta  sign. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 72,99 * 
 
(41,89)  
LIT_RATE (-1) 36,02 *** 
 
(1,87)  
LIT1% (-2) 0,28 * 
 
(0,17)  
LIT_DEP (-1) -3,76  
 
(3,79)  
NP_STOP (-2) -116,22 *** 
 
(32,9)  
LP_START (-2) -24,36 * 
 
(12,59)  
NCY_CAP (-2) 36,07  
 
(228,29)  
INHAB 0,00  
 
(1,80)  
DEBT 6,82 *** 
 
(1,82)  
UNEMPL -1641,03 *** 
 
(216,09)  
YOUNG -246,19 ** 
 
(113,62)  
OLD -60,95  
 
(93,07)  
Y09 62,80 *** 
 
(1,65)  
Y10 44,95 *** 
 
(1,78)  
Y11 50,34 *** 
 
(2,39)  
Y12 21,67 *** 
 
(2,35)  
Y13 9,57 *** 
 
(2,82)  
R-squared 0,91 
Adjusted R-squared 0,90 
N 2337 
Period 2005 - 2013 
Cross sections 308 
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As for the control variables, the analysis shows that the income tax revenues are larger in more 
populated localities (INHAB), but the locality’s scale has no significant impact. As expected, higher 
tax rates (LIT_RATE) and more fiscal capacity (LIT1%) increase the locality’s tax revenues. 
Increasing numbers of young citizens (YOUNG) and higher unemployment rates (UNEMPL) coincide 
with lower levels of income tax revenues. The variable representing the debt levels (DEBT) shows the 
expected sign and significantly affect the local tax revenues from the income tax. The coefficients of 
the degree of tax dependency (LIT_DEP(-1)) and the density of companies (NCY_CAP) are not 
significant. 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
Income shifting induced by non-neutral tax systems has received considerable attention in the US 
and in Scandinavian countries. As Alstadsæter & Jacob (2014) stated, income shifting might affect the 
economy in several ways. First, there is the general decrease in tax revenues. Secondly, they point to 
the increase in income inequality, as more wealthy individuals seem to benefit to a larger extend from 
the benefits of income shifting. Finally, they also refer to the fact that it results in misleading statistics 
when tax base are evaluated for specific taxes, rather than looking to the tax system more globally. 
In this study, we focus on yet another aspect of income shifting. We argue that the change in 
corporation form due to the more favourable tax treatment of certain company forms might also affect 
the revenues of other levels of government. We focus on the effects on the revenues of the local 
income tax (LIT). We investigate how the discontinuation of  sole proprietorships and start-ups of 
legal persons influence the revenues of the local income tax (LIT) for the local governments.  
Ideally, this analysis should be based on firm level data, identifying when an enterprise came into 
business and when it switched to a corporate form or left the sector. Unfortunately, this kind of data is 
not available for Belgium. Therefore the impact of income shifting was investigated using data 
aggregated at the level of the community. The panel contains information on the number of start-ups 
and the number of exits of natural and legal persons for all 308 Flemish communities. It covers  the 
period 2005-2013.  
Based on these aggregated data we find that the exit of sole proprietorships significantly impacts 
the creation of legal persons, which is in line with what is expected if income shifting should occur. In 
addition, the per capita revenues from the local income tax (LIT) are negatively affected by the exit of 
natural persons. Importantly, the analysis shows that the establishment of new corporations results in a 
significant decrease in the local per capita revenues of the local income tax (LIT), when controlling for 
community fixed effects and economic conditions.  
Though the analysis suggests that the corporate form matters for the local tax revenues, a lot of 
issues need further investigation. Further research should focus on how the shift in corporate forms 
affects the local labour market. Up to now it is not clear whether natural and legal persons show 
comparable levels of job creation. Could it be the case that legal persons themselves are no longer 
included in the income tax base but that this is compensated by the income of their employees living in 
the community?  In addition, distinguishing specific legal persons should further increase the insights 
concerning the effect of the choice of the corporate form on local tax revenues.   
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APPENDIX 2: DATA SOURCES  
 
 
Data Source 
The revenues of the local income tax  
(the dependent variable in the 
analysis) 
Statistics from the Flemish government, 
http://aps.vlaanderen.be/lokaal/beleidsplannen/gemeentelij
ke-profielschets.html 
 
The data concerning the period 
2006-2011 
Statistics from the Flemish government, 
http://aps.vlaanderen.be/lokaal/beleidsplannen/gemeentelij
ke-profielschets.html 
The number of corporations and self-
employed or sole proprietorships. 
Statistics Department of the National Institute for the 
Social Security of the Self-Employed 
The implicit rates of the personal 
income tax (PIT) and corporate 
income tax (CIT). 
Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do 
Micro data of the tax rate of the PIT.  
The IPCAL-database contains the 
information of approximately 36.483 
personal income tax files; random 
sample for each Region. 
Federal Department of Finance 
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APPENDIX 3: ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Fixed cross section panel estimation results for subsample (LIT_CAP>0)  
Dependent variable= LIT_CAP  
             Independent variables                                beta     sign. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 75,83 * 
 
(41,90)  
LIT_RATE(-1) 36,14  
 
(1,87) *** 
LIT1%(-2) 0,03  
 
(0,19)  
LIT_DEP(-1) -3,83  
 
(-1,01)  
NP_STOP(-2) -117,80 *** 
 
(-3,58)  
LP_START(-2) -23,83 * 
 
(12,59)  
NCY_CAP(-2) 57,50  
 
(228,92)  
INHAB 8,55E
-05
  
 
(0,00)  
DEBT 7,03 *** 
 
(1,81)  
UNEMPL -1650,69 *** 
 
(216,09)  
YOUNG -255,77 ** 
 
(113,64)  
OLD -34,05  
 
(93,87)  
Y09 63,06 *** 
 
(1,66)  
Y10 44,99 *** 
 
(1,79)  
Y11 52,61 *** 
 
(2,53)  
Y12 23,10 *** 
 
(2,42)  
Y13 11,41 *** 
 
(2,91)  
R-squared 0,901 
Adjusted R-squared 0,89 
N 2329 
Period 2005 - 2013 
Cross sections 307 
